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Abstract 
We examined whether raising uncertainty about the causes of one’s judgments motivates 
correction. Specifically, we examined whether activating chronically accessible causal 
uncertainty (CU) beliefs with a conditional warning about possible bias enhances correction of 
weather judgments for tropical weather primes and of word frequency judgments for the 
availability bias. In two studies we showed that activating chronic beliefs led to careful 
correction of target judgments. Moreover, Study 2 revealed that chronically high CU individuals 
who received a conditional warning felt more uncertain than did other participants, but that this 
uncertainty was suppressed somewhat by adjusting for the bias. Results are discussed in light of 
recent models of judgment correction (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1997), and the causal uncertainty 
model (Weary & Edwards, 1996). 
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Causal Uncertainty and Correction of Judgments 
 Every day, teachers continuously evaluate their students, senior faculty members 
formally and informally evaluate their junior colleagues, and screening personnel evaluate the 
risk-potential of airline passengers. We often are interested in making good, or unbiased, 
judgments in such cases, and sometimes even in matters that are less consequential. For example, 
we may want to know that the travel brochures we received in the mail have not biased our 
judgments about possible vacation sites. But how do we know our judgments are good ones?  
The answer seems to be that often we do not.  In many instances there simply are few reliable or 
salient external or internal cues suggestive of bias (Wilson & Brekke, 1994).  
Questions such as the one posed above recently have led many investigators to focus on 
factors that might instigate the search and correction for unwanted influences on judgments (e.g., 
Martin, Seta & Crelia, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Weary, Tobin, & Reich, 2001; Wegener & 
Petty, 1995; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). In the current research, we examined one such factor.  
Specifically, we examined how individual differences in causal uncertainty relate to judgmental 
correction processes.  
The Causal Uncertainty Model 
People often strive to perceive and understand reality accurately (Berlyne, 1962; 
Festinger, 1954; Kagan, 1972), and their causal analyses of events are central to this pursuit. The 
causal uncertainty model (Weary & Edwards, 1994; 1996) addresses what happens when 
perceivers come to doubt their ability to make sense of events. The model suggests that some 
people possess chronically accessible beliefs (c.f., Edwards & Weary, 1998; Jacobson, Weary & 
Edwards, 1999), beliefs that they might not adequately understand or be able to detect the causes 
of events, including behavior and subjective experiences of the self or others. Moreover, it 
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suggests that such beliefs are easily activated by various situational factors (e.g., unexpected or 
negative events, instructions to focus on the causes of events, even situational information 
relevant to causal analyses). 
The model further argues that when causal uncertainty (CU) beliefs are activated, they 
give rise to feelings of surprise, bewilderment, or confusion that alert perceivers to the 
inadequate state of their current causal knowledge. They also are thought to automatically 
activate a goal of accurate causal understanding and various strategies to achieve that goal. Such 
strategies are thought often to entail a careful search for and processing of diagnostic information 
(Edwards, 1998; Weary & Jacobson, 1997; Weary et al., 2001) and to result in a reduction of 
uncertainty feelings.  
To date, investigations have examined the strategies employed by perceivers only in 
response to activation of uncertainty about others’ behaviors. The current research extends the 
role of causal uncertainty to perceivers’ understandings of their own experiences. Specifically, 
we examine whether causal uncertainty motivates correction when the situation subtly calls into 
question the causes of perceivers’ judgments.  
The Current Research  
Numerous models propose that people use metacognitive theories of bias when 
attempting to correct their judgments for unwanted influences (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1995; 
Wilson & Brekke, 1994). In particular, the flexible correction model (Petty and Wegener, 1993, 
1997; Wegener & Petty, 1995) proposes that individuals use naïve theories about how various 
contexts influence target judgments. As a demonstration of this point, Petty and Wegener (1993; 
Wegener & Petty, 1995) showed that individuals tend to believe that thinking about the weather 
in tropical vacation spots makes the weather in Midwestern locations seem less desirable. When 
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explicitly instructed to correct for the biasing effect of the “vacation locations” context (without 
being told what the direction of that bias was), participants adjusted their judgments away from 
the direction of bias. 
In an extension of Petty and Wegner’s research, Stapel, Martin and Schwarz (1998) 
presented participants with a subtle or salient contextual bias and then gave some participants a 
warning about the possibility that their judgments were contaminated. Blatantly warning 
participants not to let the context influence their judgments led to correction, regardless of 
whether the bias was salient or subtle. By contrast, conditionally warning participants, by telling 
them that their judgments might be biased and that they should correct them if necessary, led to 
correction for the salient bias only. Because the corrections seemed to require either a blatant 
warning or a salient source of bias, Stapel et al. concluded that corrections for contextual biases 
do not come easily. 
We believe, however, that correction attempts might come more easily for some people 
than for others. More specifically, we believe that people who possess chronically accessible 
causal uncertainty beliefs might be more likely to have those beliefs activated by a subtle, 
conditional warning of bias, and as a result they might be more vigilant and more motivated to 
detect and remove unwanted influences on their judgments. Moreover, they might be better at 
making judgmental corrections (i.e., they might have highly proceduralized and well-calibrated 
correction strategies).  
Pilot Studies 
In two pilot studies, we examined whether individual differences in causal uncertainty 
might be confounded with differential theories about the biasing contexts (Pilot Study A) or with 
differential extremity and certainty of the target judgments (Pilot Study B) employed in the 
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current research. In Pilot Study A, participants reported how they thought being in one’s dream 
vacation spot would influence judgments about the pleasantness of an ordinary location (-4 = 
would make it seem less pleasant; +4 = more pleasant). They also reported how finding it easier 
to recall r-first than r-third words would affect a related frequency estimate (-4 = make it seem 
like there are many more 3rd letter “r” words; +4 = many more 1st letter “r” words). Participants 
believed that being in the location of one's dream vacation would make ordinary locations seem 
less pleasant (M = -2.34, t(28) = -7.34, p < .001). Also, they believed that harder to recall words 
would seem less frequent than easier to recall words (M = -1.72, t(28) = -4.73, p < .001). Finally, 
their Causal Uncertainty Scale (CUS, described in Study 1) scores (n = 29; CUS M = 38.10) 
were unrelated to either theory of bias (ps > .75).  
Participants in Pilot Study B rated the desirability of the weather in Indianapolis, Kansas 
City, and Des Moines (1 = not at all desirable; 9 = very desirable). They also estimated the 
relative frequency of r-first and r-third words in the English language (1 = many more words with 
“r” as first letter; 9 = many more words with “r” a third letter) and rated how confident they 
were in each answer (1 = not at all confident; 9 = extremely confident). Weather ratings were at 
or significantly below the scale midpoint (Ms = 4.35 to 4.89, t(36)s = -.45 to –2.20, ps > .03). 
Word frequency judgments (M = 3.84) were significantly below the scale midpoint (t(36) = -
3.45, p = .001), indicating the expected availability bias. Confidence ratings for each judgment 
were moderate (Ms = 4.35 to 4.89, t(36)s = -1.18 to –1.98, ps > .05). CUS scores (n = 37, CUS M 
= 37.38) were unrelated to any of the ratings (ps > 20).  
Thus, individual differences in causal uncertainty were unrelated to intuitions about the 
biasing contexts we used, and to certainty or extremity of our target judgments. Individuals 
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generally were moderately confident in these judgments and had naïve theories of bias that were 
consistent with prior research (Petty & Wegener, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) 
Study 1 
In Study 1 we examined how activating causal uncertainty beliefs influences correction 
of weather desirability judgments. We expected that a conditional warning would subtly activate 
CU beliefs, especially among participants chronically high in CU. Thus, high CU participants 
who received a conditional warning should be most likely to correct their judgments. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 One hundred ninety-five Introductory Psychology students were randomly assigned to a 
warning condition (none vs. conditional). Additionally, 49 participants in a non-factorial control 
condition (run at the same time) rated the target stimuli without having been exposed to the 
contextual stimuli. All participants received course credit for participation. 
Causal Uncertainty Scale 
The CUS (Weary & Edwards, 1994) is a 14-item scale that measures the frequency and 
strength of doubts about one’s ability to understand the causes of behavior or experiences. Items 
are scored on a 1-6 scale and summed to form an index, with higher numbers indicating more 
causal uncertainty. Research has shown that the CUS has high internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .83), and good construct validity (Weary & Edwards, 1994; 1996). The mean CUS score 
in Study 1 was 35.64 (SD = 10.08). Regressing CUS scores on effects-coded warning condition 
(-1 = no warning; 1 = conditional warning) revealed no condition effect (p > .20). 
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Procedure 
Judgment task. Participants learned that they would be completing materials for several 
researchers during the session (all materials were for the current experiment). The first packet of 
materials was entitled "Judgments of Locations" and was similar to that used by Stapel et al. 
(1998, pp. 800 - 801) and by Wegener and Petty (1993, p. 41). On the first page, participants 
read the following introduction for the experiment (from Stapel et al.): 
This study is part of a larger research project that looks at the different ways in which 
people evaluate and judge locations, such as parks, cities, and countries. In this research 
project, we use several questionnaires to assess people’s perceptions and evaluations of 
all sorts of locations. 
Following exposure to the contextual stimuli (i.e, thinking about the Bahamas, Hawaii, 
and Jamaica), half of the participants rated the desirability of the weather in Midwestern 
locations: Indianapolis, Kansas City, and Des Moines. The others read a conditional warning 
before completing their target ratings. The warning (Stapel et al., 1998) asked participants to: 
Please try to make sure that your ratings of the desirability of the weather in the locations 
below reflect your true response. When you feel there is something that may have an 
unwanted influence on your ratings, please try to adjust for that influence. 
Participants in the control group rated the stimuli without being exposed to the bias or the 
conditional warning. 1   
Filler task. After completing the first set of materials, participants received a 
questionnaire entitled “Health Status of College Undergraduates". In it, they reported various 
health-relevant behaviors and rated the likelihood of experiencing health problems in the future. 
The questionnaire took 5-7 minutes to complete. 
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Individual difference measures. The final set of materials was entitled “Psychology 
Department Scaling Study.” Its ostensible purpose was to check the reliability and validity of 
several (untitled) personality scales. Of interest for the current experiment was the CUS, which 
was counterbalanced with the other scales between participants.  
Results and Discussion 
Desirability ratings of the three midwestern targets were averaged to form a single index 
(Cronbach's alpha = .75). Because thinking about tropical vacation spots usually makes the 
weather in Midwestern locations seem worse by comparison, more favorable weather ratings 
would indicate correction for the tropical weather primes.  
The warning variable was effects coded (-1 = no warning, 1 = conditional warning), and 
CUS scores were standardized (to minimize problems with multicollinearity between continuous 
predictors and related interaction terms; Aiken & West, 1990; West, Aiken & Krull, 1996). 
Because standardizing an effects-coded predictor could introduce bias into resulting coefficients 
(Cohen & Cohen, 1983), the dependent variables also were standardized so Bs could be 
interpreted as s.  
Control Condition 
In the control (no bias, no warning) condition, CUS scores were unrelated to weather 
judgments, r = .01, p > .90. Judgments were not significantly different from the midpoint of the 
scale (M = 4.86; t(48) = -.79, p > .40), or from weather ratings in Pilot Study B (t(84) = -1.17, p 
> .20).  
Experimental Conditions 
Simultaneously regressing the Midwestern cities index onto CUS scores, the warning 
variable, and the interaction term revealed a significant CUS X Warning interaction;  = .20, t = 
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2.43, p = .01. As expected, causal uncertainty was unrelated to correction when participants 
received no warning about a possible influence on their judgments; causal uncertainty simple 
slope  = -.06, t = -0.59, p > .55. However, it was positively related to correction when 
participants received a conditional warning; causal uncertainty simple slope  = .32, t = 2.88, p = 
.004. Figure 1 displays these results at + 1 and 2 SDs from the mean of CUS (to represent most 
of the range of CUS scores), and the mean target rating in the control condition.  
Another way to look at the interaction is to focus on the differences between the two lines 
at + 2 SDs from the mean of CUS, to examine the impact of the warning manipulation on the 
highest and lowest CU participants. The difference between warning and no warning conditions 
was significant at two SDs above the mean of CUS; simple slope for warning  = .46, t = 2.82, p 
= .005. By contrast, the difference between the warning and no warning conditions was not 
significant at two SDs below the mean of CUS; simple slope for warning  = -.29, t = -1.79, p > 
.05.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
The results of Study 1 thus supported our hypothesis: when participants received a 
conditional warning, causal uncertainty was positively related to correction. These results 
suggest that activating uncertainty about the causes of one’s judgments motivates correction of 
judgments. Additionally, they suggest that high-CU individuals might take a relatively tentative 
approach to correction, as they did not overcorrect (c.f. Stapel et al., 1998). Alternatively, the 
lack of overcorrection might reflect a remarkable sensitivity to the direction and degree of bias 
on the part of high-CU individuals. One purpose of Study 2 was to examine these possibilities.  
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Study 2 
We had two primary objectives for Study 2. One was to test the generalizability of the 
Study 1 results by examining correction of word frequency judgments for the biasing effect of 
the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The availability heuristic is the rule of 
thumb by which one bases frequency, likelihood, or typicality judgments on the ease of bringing 
relevant information to mind. For example, if people rely on the availability heuristic to judge 
the relative frequency of r-first and r-third words, they will erroneously conclude that r-first 
words are more common (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Wanke et al., 1995).  
Our second objective was to examine whether adjusting judgments away from the 
direction of bias would reduce uncertainty feelings, especially for high CU people who receive a 
conditional warning. The CU model suggests that if using correction strategies helps one 
perceive that one is making more accurate judgments, attempted correction should reduce 
uncertainty feelings. However, because it is generally difficult to determine whether one has 
accurately identified a potential bias or corrected sufficiently for it (e.g., Martin & Stapel, 1998; 
Petty & Wegener, 1993; Sommers & Kassin, 2001; Wegener & Petty, 1995, 1997; Wilson & 
Brekke, 1994), correction should result in only a partial reduction. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Seventy-three Introductory Psychology students were randomly assigned to either a no 
warning or a conditional warning condition. All participants received course credit.  
Causal Uncertainty Scale  
The mean CUS score for the sample was 35.38 (SD = 11.56). There was no significant 
effect of warning condition on CUS scores (p > .60).  
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Procedure 
Judgment task. Participants learned that they would be completing materials for several 
researchers during the session (all were for the current experiment).  Instructions for the first 
packet of materials indicated that the study concerned the influence of several variables on 
language production (Wanke et al., 1995).  On the first page, participants were asked to write 
down ten words that had "r" as their first letter and to rate the difficulty of that task (1 = not at all 
difficult; 8 = extremely difficult). On the second page, they were asked to write down ten words 
that had "r" as their third letter and to rate the difficulty of that task.  
Next, participants learned that they would receive some follow-up questions about the 
language production tasks. Participants in the conditional warning condition read that they 
should make sure their answers were unbiased, and that when they felt there was something that 
may have had an unwanted influence on their answers, they should try to adjust for that 
influence. All participants then estimated the relative frequency of r-first and r-third words in the 
English language (1 = many more 3rd letter "r" words; 9 = many more 1st letter "r" words). 
Finally, to support the cover story, we asked participants several questions about variables 
supposedly related to verbal abilities (e.g., their major, handedness). 
First filler task. After completing the first set of materials, participants received a packet 
entitled “Perceptions of Animals” in which they rated their perceptions of various animals’ sizes. 
This questionnaire took about 3 minutes to complete. 
Measures of uncertainty feelings. Next, participants completed a “pilot study” about 
current feelings. Among the 8 items were several assessing their current feelings of uncertainty: 
"I feel uncertain", "I feel confident" (reversed), and "I feel satisfied" (reversed), "I feel unsure" (1 
= not at all ...; 9 = extremely...). The uncertainty-related items were highly related (Cronbach's 
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alpha = .82) and were averaged to form an index of uncertainty feelings. Higher scores indicated 
greater uncertainty. 
Second filler task, and individual difference measures. Next, participants completed a 5-
minute “Consumer Survey” in which they reported their favorite brand (of toothpaste, shampoo, 
fast food, etc.), how many times a month they had purchased it, and why they preferred it (price, 
quality or other). Finally, participants completed the “Psychology Department Scaling Study” 
used in Experiment 1, which contained the (untitled) Causal Uncertainty Scale. 
Results 
As in Study 1, the warning variable was effects coded (-1 = no warning, 1 = conditional 
warning). Additionally, CUS scores and the dependent variables were standardized.  
Experienced Difficulty 
 A paired-samples t-test run on participants' ratings of the experienced difficulty of 
recalling r-third and r-first words showed that participants found r-third words more difficult to 
recall (M = 4.08) than r-first words (M = 2.08), t(72) = -8.99, p < .001. Simultaneously 
regressing the difference between the r-third and r-first difficulty ratings on CUS, the warning 
variable, and their interaction revealed no significant effects (ps > .35).  
Frequency Estimates   
We expected that when participants received a conditional warning, those higher in CU 
would be more likely to correct their judgments for the observed availability bias. 
Simultaneously regressing participants' frequency estimates onto their CUS scores, the warning 
variable, and the interaction term revealed the predicted CUS X Warning interaction;  = .35, t = 
2.98, p = .004 (see Figure 2). Subsequent analyses indicated that under a conditional warning, 
CUS and correction were positively related; CUS simple slope  = .40, t = 2.19, p = .03. In the 
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no warning condition, there was an unexpected, negative relationship between CUS and 
adjustment; CUS simple slope  = -.35, t = -2.03, p = .05. The difference between warning and 
no warning conditions was significant at two standard deviations above the mean of CUS; simple 
slope for warning  = .82, t = 3.16, p = .002. Likewise, the difference between the warning and 
no warning conditions also was significant at two standard deviations below the mean of CUS; 
simple slope for warning  = -.56, t = -2.20, p = .03. Figure 2 displays these results at + 1 and 2 
SD’s from the mean of the CUS.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
     ------------------------------------ 
Uncertainty Feelings  
We simultaneously regressed the index of uncertainty feelings onto participants' CUS 
scores, the warning variable, and the interaction term. Overall, higher CU participants reported 
stronger feelings of uncertainty;  = .54, t = 5.12, p < .001. This was not unexpected because 
uncertainty feelings are typical for high CU individuals (Weary & Edwards, 1996). However, 
this effect was qualified by a CUS X Warning interaction;  = .25, t = 2.33, p = .02 (see Figure 
3). As expected, the relationship between causal uncertainty beliefs and feelings of uncertainty 
was more pronounced among the participants who received the conditional warning (simple 
slope for causal uncertainty  = .79, t = 4.70, p < .001) than among participants who received no 
warning (simple slope for causal uncertainty  = .30, t = 2.28, p = .03).  
Focusing on the differences between the two lines at + 2 SDs from the mean of CUS 
shows that a conditional warning activates a stronger state of uncertainty among individuals with 
more chronically accessible CU beliefs. The difference between warning and no warning lines 
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was significant at two SDs above the mean of CUS (simple slope for warning  = .56, t = 2.37, p 
= .02), but not at two SDs below the mean of CUS (simple slope for warning  = -.42, t = -1.82, 
p > .05).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Alleviation of Uncertainty Feelings 
Among high CU participants who received a conditional warning, correction of 
judgments should partially suppress uncertainty feelings. We did not expect such suppression in 
the no warning condition. Accordingly, we carried out separate tests for suppression effects (cf. 
analysis of mediation, Baron & Kenny, 1986) in the warning and no warning conditions.  
Warning condition. An initial regression analysis showed that CUS scores were 
significantly related to feelings of uncertainty,  = .79, t = 4.99, p < .001. A separate regression 
analysis revealed that CUS scores were significantly related to adjustment of judgments away 
from the direction of bias (the hypothesized suppressor),  = .40, t = 2.12, p = .04. Next, a 
simultaneous regression of uncertainty feelings on CUS scores and adjustment of judgments 
showed that adjustment was significantly related to feelings of uncertainty,  = -.30, t = -2.19, p 
= .04. Moreover, causal uncertainty and feelings of uncertainty were more strongly related after 
controlling for the suppressor,  = .89, t = 5.67, p < .001. This partial suppression effect was 
significant, Sobel test (1982) Z = -1.45, t = -1.85; one-tailed p < .05 (See Figure 4). 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
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No warning condition. An initial regression analysis showed that CUS was significantly 
related to uncertainty feelings,  = .30, t = 2.16, p = .04. A separate regression analysis revealed 
that CUS was negatively related to adjustment of judgments away from the direction of bias,  = 
-.29, t = -2.11, p = .04. Next, a simultaneous regression of uncertainty feelings on CUS and 
adjustment of judgments showed that adjustment was not significantly related to feelings of 
uncertainty,  = -.03, t = -0.18, p > .85. Moreover, the relationship between CUS and uncertainty 
feelings remained essentially unchanged,  = .29, t = 1.94, p = .06 (See Figure 5). As expected, 
then, adjustment of judgments by these participants did not suppress the relationship between CU 
beliefs and uncertainty feelings. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
Discussion 
Study 2 provided additional evidence that activating causal uncertainty about one’s 
judgments motivates correction. Here, though, even the highest CU individuals undercorrected 
for bias. Thus, it appears that high CU individuals take a careful, tentative, but not perfectly 
calibrated approach to correction. This finding might not be surprising, given that salient and 
reliable bias cues are rare (e.g., Wilson & Brekke, 1994) and that CUS is unrelated to the theory 
of bias investigated in Study 2.  
The results of Study 2 also showed that the corrections made by high CU participants 
partially alleviated their uncertainty feelings.  Such findings are particularly important because 
they might help to explain the persistence of chronic CU beliefs and feelings. That is,  perceivers 
often might be unable to know for sure whether their causal assessments and corrections based 
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on them are completely adequate. Moreover, this might be particularly troubling for high-CU 
individuals who theoretically would be expected to be more sensitive to discrepancies between 
current and desired states of causal knowledge. 
Before concluding, we should note that we ran a follow-up study to see whether the 
negative relationship between chronic causal uncertainty beliefs and target judgments in the no 
warning condition of Study 2 would replicate. In that study, 41 Introduction to Psychology 
students participated in the same procedure as in the no warning condition of Study 2. The mean 
frequency estimate in this study (M = 3.39) was significantly lower than the midpoint of the 
scale, again indicating the availability bias; t(40) = -6.34, p < .001. However, the unexpected 
relationship between causal uncertainty and target judgments did not replicate,  = -.13, t = -
0.86, p > .35. Thus, the unexpected evidence of correction by low causal uncertainty-no warning 
participants in Study 2 might well have been a chance finding.3 
General Discussion 
The current research is the first to show that implications of the causal uncertainty model 
hold when the target of uncertainty concerns one’s self and subjective experiences (cf. Edwards, 
1998; Vaughn, Weary & Edwards, 2000; Weary & Edwards, 1994; Weary & Jacobson, 1997). It 
also extends recent models of judgmental correction processes (e.g., Martin, Seta & Crelia, 1990; 
Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wilson & Brekke, 1994) by showing that 
activating chronic CU beliefs (in this case, by activating uncertainty about the causes of one’s 
judgments via a conditional warning about possible bias) motivates a tentative and careful 
approach to corrections. Although not examined here, similar correction of target judgments 
should follow from temporary activation of available, but nonchronic CU beliefs (Weary & 
Edwards, 1994; 1996).4 
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In the current work, we have proposed that when people chronically high in CU receive a 
conditional warning, they become motivated to correct their judgments for bias. A possible 
alternative explanation is that high CU individuals are simply more attuned to social desirability 
concerns and just moderated their judgments under a conditional warning to present a more 
positive self-image. However, self-presentational concerns do not seem a plausible alternative 
explanation for the current results, because CU beliefs are unrelated to social desirability (Weary 
& Edwards, 1994). Moreover, the positive correlations found between CU and depression, 
perceived control loss, and neuroticism (e.g., Edwards & Weary, 1998; Edwards, Weary & 
Reich, 1998; Jacobson, Weary & Edwards, 1999; Weary & Edwards, 1994, 1996; Weary & 
Jacobson, 1997; Weary, Jacobson, Edwards & Tobin, 2001) suggest that high CU individuals are 
not unwilling to convey negative impressions of the self.  
Before concluding, it would seem important to ask whether our correction findings are 
specific to causal uncertainty per se, or whether they also might result from activation of other 
kinds of uncertainty motives. Certainly, individual differences in uncertainty orientation 
(Sorrentino, Bobocel, Gitta, Olson & Hewitt, 1988) can influence the content and processes of 
making various social judgments.  For example, uncertainty reduction has been shown to 
motivate systematic processing of highly self-relevant information, whereas certainty-orientation 
motivates systematic processing of less self-relevant information. Moreover, personal 
uncertainty (awareness of dissonant self-beliefs) can lead to defensive, compensatory conviction 
in one’s beliefs and values (McGregor, Zanna, Holmes & Spencer, 2001). However, these and 
other sorts of uncertainty motivations might not increase cognitive processing about possible 
biases on one’s judgments.  Activated uncertainty probably would need to address the causes of 
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judgments for it to instigate the kind of judgmental corrections we observed here. Future 
research, however, will need to examine the validity of this argument.  
In the future, it also might be useful to examine whether other bias-influenced 
phenomena are impacted by causal uncertainty. Candidates include persuasion (e.g., Petty, 
Brinol & Tormala, 2002) affective forecasting (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 
1997; Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000), and the effects of cognitive and 
affective feelings on judgments (Schwarz & Clore, 1996).  
Conclusion 
In general, people seem to be naïve realists with regard to their own reactions and 
judgments (Higgins, 1998), apparently assuming that they are caused by what they seem to be 
“about.” Such causal certainty may, in fact, lead to complacency about possible biases on 
judgments. The current research suggests that raising causal uncertainty about one’s judgments 
elicits careful, tentative correction for bias. In addition, it appears that at least among people with 
chronically accessible causal uncertainty beliefs, correction of judgments partly reduces feelings 
of uncertainty. Causal uncertainty thus increases the motivation to carefully correct current 
judgments and may enhance the likelihood of future corrections. 
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Footnotes 
1 Following Stapel et al. (1998), we attempted to manipulate the salience of the bias. 
Participants read (subtle bias) or rated (salient bias) the names of tropical vacation spots before 
receiving a warning or no warning and making their target judgments. Because this manipulation 
was ineffective and yielded no significant effects, we do not discuss it further. 
2 One participant did not complete the measure of uncertainty feelings. 
3 Some readers might wonder whether the unexpected CU-correction relationship in the 
no-warning condition might have occurred in the warning condition as well.  If in Study 2 low-
CU participants generally had shown less of an availability bias than high-CU participants, then 
the positive CU-correction relationship under a conditional warning would have been contrary to 
that trend.  Moreover, the Study 2 results still would have shown that high-CU individuals took a 
tentative, careful, but not perfectly calibrated approach to correction.  If their approach were 
perfectly calibrated, the highest-CU participants would not have undercorrected their judgments. 
 4 Need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) is negatively associated with causal 
uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1996) and positively associated with correction of judgments 
(D'Agostino & Fincher-Keifer, 1992; DeSteno, Petty, Wegener & Rucker, 2000; Martin et al., 
1990). To see whether any of our causal uncertainty results could be explained by need for 
cognition, the 18-item short form of the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 
1984) was included in the "Psychology Department Scaling Study" in Studies 1 and 2. When we 
added standardized Need for Cognition Scale scores to the regression analyses for target 
judgments in Studies 1 and 2, the CUS X Warning interactions remained significant. Thus, need 
for cognition cannot account for our causal uncertainty findings in either study. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Regression of weather judgments on causal uncertainty scores and warning condition 
in Study 1.  
Figure 2. Regression of word frequency judgments on causal uncertainty scores and warning 
condition in Study 2. 
Figure 3. Regression of uncertainty feelings on causal uncertainty scores and warning condition 
in Study 2. 
Figure 4. Path analysis of the relationship between causal uncertainty scores, correction of 
frequency judgments, and feelings of uncertainty; warning condition in Study 2. 
Figure 5. Path analysis of the relationship between causal uncertainty scores, correction of 
frequency judgments, and feelings of uncertainty; no warning condition in Study 2. 
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Note. Scale range of weather judgments is from 1 (not at all desirable) to 9 (very desirable). The 
mean target rating of participants in the control group, who were not exposed to any of the 
context stimuli, was 4.86. 
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Note. Scale range of the relative frequency estimate is from 1 (many more r-first words) to 9 
(many more r-third words). The mean relative frequency estimate of participants in Study 1b, 
who were not exposed to any of the context stimuli, was 6.16. 
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Note. Scale range of uncertainty feelings is from 1 (not at all uncertain) to 9 (extremely 
uncertain). 
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